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This paper discusses the prospects for manufactured exports from de- 
veloping countries (the South) to the European Community (EC). Can 
and will the EC absorb the additional goods which these countries need 
to export to pay for the imports required for their development? What 
kinds of products will they sell? What are the commodity groups for 
which rising Southern exports may cause trade tension? 
To investigate these issues, the paper uses a recently developed data 
bank, created at the initiative of the World Bank. By converting trade 
and  production to a  single classification,  it  is possible  to calculate 
apparent consumption of the various goods and to calculate “market 
penetration rates”  (the ratio of imports to that consumption). 
The paper first describes this data base. To  provide a comparative 
setting and to highlight the connection between market  shares and 
protection,  the second section compares the trade data of  the  “Big 
Three”  trading nations: the United States, Japan, and the European 
Community. (The EC is a “nation”  in this paper for linguistic simplic- 
ity.) That section examines some large shifts that have occurred in 
world trade, which have motivated the major trade disputes of recent 
years. The third section provides evidence that, although the EC is in 
principle  a  single trading  area with  a unified  system of protection, 
countries have managed in practice to retain a good deal of autonomy 
in trade policy and have quite different degrees of openness to imports 
from developing countries. The fourth section describes trends in trade 
for different groups of commodities and assesses the implications of 
these trends for the future. The paper closes with conclusions. 
Jean  Waelbroeck is a professor of economics at the Center for Econometrics  and 
Mathematical Economics at the Free University of Brussels, Brussels, Belgium. 
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3.1  The Data Base 
The data base, constructed in the framework of a World Bank re- 
search project,’ provides comparable data on production and trade in 
eleven developed countries (Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States). The “EC”  of 
the tables accordingly describes the European Community minus Ire- 
land and Denmark. 
The figures are obtained by converting all data to the international 
standard industrial classification (ISIC). For production data, this was 
done by economists in each country, who processed data organized 
according to the country’s national classification to convert it to the 
international classification. The trade data were developed by the World 
Bank’s staff by aggregating data from the United Nations’ trade tapes 
to an ISIC basis,  organized according to the standard international 
trade classification (SITC). 
In each country, the person responsible used his own judgment and 
unofficial correspondences that might be available to establish the mode 
of conversion from the national to the international basis. (In Sweden, 
the statistical office produces production data on an ISIC basis.) For 
the trade data, the World Bank used the concordance established by 
the United Nations (1958) which converts the five-digit SITC to the 
four-digit ISIC.  A number  of  five-digit ISIC items were created to 
highlight products that are of particular importance to developing coun- 
tries, and the United Nations concordance was extended appropriately. 
This work is currently being transferred to the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
3.2  The Big Three Trading Nations in the 1970s and Their Trade 
To  set the South’s exports of manufactures to the EC in the right 
perspective, this section brings together the main facts concerning the 
exports and imports of  these goods by the Big Three trading nations: 
the United States, Japan, and the EC. A more detailed discussion of 
the trade of the first two is to be found in the contributions of Branson 
and Yamazawa in this volume (chaps. 2 and 4). 
3.2.1  Market Size and Openness 
In 1980 the United States was the largest producer and consumer of 
manufactures, by a small margin over the EC; the rise of the dollar 
and the economic recovery in that country since that year have widened 
the gap. Japan’s consumption is roughly half as large as that of  the 
other two (table 3.1). Table 3.1  Geographic Patterns of  Trade in  Manufactures of the EC, the United States, and Japan (billions of U.S.  Dollars) 
1970  1980 
EC  U.S.  Japan  EC  U.S.  Japan 
M  E  M  E  M  E  M  E  M  E  M  E 
Total  37.0a  53.9a  33.1  34.8  8.5  18.9  221.1a  295.9"  162.0  167.5  48.6  127.4 
Southern Europe  2.0  6.0  0.6  1.3  0.1  0.6 
East Asian NICs  0.8  1.0  1.8  1.1  0.5  2.6 
Latin America  3.0  4.0  3.9  5.7  0.3  1.1 
Other developing countries  4.9  10.5  1.4  4.6  1.6  4.5 
Developing countries  8.7  15.6  7.2  11.4  2.4  8.2 
All developed countries  24.0  28.8  25.1  21.8  5.8  9.8 
Socialist countries  2.3  3.4  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4 
EC  46.2  46.2  8.2  8.6  1.4  1.7 
ASEAN  0.4  1.2  0.7  0.9  0.2  1.6 










30.8  3.0  4.8  0.5  2.1 
7.3  18.2  10.9  6.1  18.6 
2.4  8.3  17.8  22.8  32.2 
10.0  36.2  87.1  10.5  25.7 
18.5  63.1  112.2  51.4  68.9 
132.1  106.2  92.5  28.7  58.8 
20.9  1.4  1.3  1.0  3.4 
278.2  32.3  38.8  6.8  15.6 
7.0  6.8  7.7  4.0  10.8 
~~  ~  ~  ~~ 
C  P  C  P  C  P  C  P  C  P  C  P 
Consumption  403.8  595.9  179.1  1,526.7  1,869.6  7,722.0 
Production  420.7  597.6  189.5  1,601.5  1,875.2  85  1  .O 
Imports/consumption  9.16  5.56  4.72  14.48a  8.66  6.29 
Exports/production  12.81  5.82  9.99  18.48a  8.93  14.97 
Note: M  = imports; E = exports; C = Consumption; P = Production. 
aExcluding intra-EC trade. 64  Jean Waelbroeck 
Trade in manufactures  of  the United  States is nearly in balance, 
whereas the EC and Japan earn surpluses, which are needed to pay 
for their large net imports of primary commodities and, in the case of 
Japan, of  services.  The European and Japanese surpluses would be 
even larger if resource-intensive manufactures such as timber and wood 
products, nonferrous metals, and manufactured foods were excluded 
from the total. 
The EC is the most open of the three “big traders”  to imports of 
manufactures, by a comfortable margin. The United States comes next, 
and Japan is not as far behind as is sometimes said; it is, however, true 
that, as a smaller economy, that country would be expected to trade 
more than the others in relation to its size. 
Judging from recent figures on world trade, the gap in openness to 
trade between the EC and the United States has shrunk since 1980, 
but this reflects to a large extent the rising American trade deficit. The 
deficit is due to the unorthodox policies pursued by that country re- 
cently. This deficit is in any event not sustainable and reflects temporary 
factors: strong recovery in the United States at a time when unem- 
ployment is still rising in Europe and the overvaluation of the dollar. 
A return to a more normal balance of trade, which will eventually take 
place, will reduce imports. 
Because Japan’s imports of manufactures are low, the trade figures 
look lopsided, with exports far larger than imports. Although in dollar 
terms,  the  EC and Japanese  surpluses in manufactures  are roughly 
equal, the ratios of those surpluses to imports are sharply different. 
The ratio was  162% in Japan in 1980, a year in which the surplus in 
the EC amounted to 34% of  imports. 
3.2.2  The Geographical Pattern of Trade 
Table 3.1 illustrates the polarization of trade according to proximity. 
Latin America trades predominantly with the United States; southern 
Europe and the European centrally planned economies (CPE) with the 
EC; and the Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) and the As- 
sociation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with Japan. A curious 
“backyard effect” is to be noted in each case. With the exception of 
the EC’s trade with the CPEs, which is subject to agreements pre- 
scribing bilateral balance, trade of the Big Three with their hinterlands 
yields exceptionally large surpluses. 
A striking feature is the growing trading strength of developing coun- 
tries. Both their exports to and their imports from the Big Three have 
been rising rapidly. Trade of the South with the Big Three rose from 
being equivalent to 46% of the latter’s trade with developed countries 
in  1970 to 66% of that total ten years later. The developing countries 
remain large net importers of manufactures. These net imports grew 65  Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries 
with trade: the ratio of imports to exports did not change markedly. In 
net terms, the South has continued to be a net creator of manufacturing 
jobs in the developed countries: its import needs have helped to slow 
down deindustrialization. 
The countries of East Asia have played a significant but by no means 
exclusive role in bringing about this change. In terms of fractions of 
the Big Three’s trade with developed countries, the trade of the East 
Asian NICs and ASEAN grew from 6.8% and 5.0% to 13.1% and 7.6%, 
respectively. 
As noted by Branson in chapter 2 of this volume, U.S.  trade with 
the NICs of Latin America and Asia has increased considerably. These 
countries have built up strong industrial sectors and have become sig- 
nificant exporters of manufactures. The EC’s trade is oriented quite 
differently. The countries of Africa and OPEC, which make up most 
of  the category  “other  developing countries”  in table 3.1, play the 
dominant role.  Such an orientation is easy to understand in terms of 
geography and past colonial links. Because of this, however, the EC 
trades mainly with countries which are not yet significant exporters of 
manufactured goods. 
These is much vague talk in Europe about the NICs and the problems 
which they will cause, but the figures show that at present they do not 
matter  much  to the EC. This situation  will  not  last.  The NICs are 
growing fast, and they are being joined by the “new  NICs”  in Asia 
and in the Mediterranean area, for example. The EC cannot escape 
from their trade dynamism and its consequences and should begin to 
think with care about issues of reciprocity in trade, which are a critical 
element of present policy debate in  the  United  States. More active 
discussion is needed about the best ways for the EC to both adjust to 
and benefit from the rapid economic growth of the NICs. 
3.2.3  Patterns of Specialization in International Trade 
There is  not  much  difference  in production patterns in  the three 
countries (tables 3.2-3.4). Patterns of apparent consumption are even 
more similar. 
With respect to trade, the large share of steel and other metal goods 
in Japanese exports is to be noted. These goods are energy-intensive, 
and the energy embodied in these exports is another reason why Japan 
has such a strong need to earn an export surplus in manufactures. 
The EC is a larger net exporter of metal goods, though the magnitude 
is no larger than Japan’s. The chemical industry is the EC’s other major 
net earner of foreign exchange. Net exports of steel remain consider- 
able. They have, however, ceased to have a rationale in terms of com- 
parative advantage and remain high only thanks to the extremely heavy 
subsidies which member country governments grant to EC producers 66  Jean Waelbroeck 
Table 3.2  Patterns of Production and Trade in the European Community 
(1980, billions of U.S. dollars, intra-EC trade excluded) 
1970  1980 
P  M  E  P  M  E 
31  Food, drink, tobacco 




33  Wood 
34  Pulp paper 
35  Chemicals 
36  Nonmetallic products 
371 Steel 
372 Nonferrous metals 
38  Metal products 
382 Nonelectrical  machinery 
383 Electrical machinery 
384 Transport equipment 
39  Other manufactures 
3  All manufactures 
72.4  7.6  3.1  271.2 
43.0  2.7  4.9  113.7 
26.2  1.5  3.1  66.2 
10.6  0.8  0.9  30.6 
3.9  0.1  0.6  9.8 
11.8  1.9  0.4  47.8 
23.0  2.8  1.1  83.9 
66.4  4.2  9.5  337.8 
15.9  0.4  0.3  57.9 
32.6  1.8  4.1  99.7 
10.8  4.8  1.4  34.4 
141.1  9.9  27.2  541.4 
42.5  3.9  10.6  156.3 
29.2  1.9  4.3  109.5 
38.1  2.0  8.9  174.0 
3.6  1.0  1.2  13.9 
420.7  37.0  53.9  1,601.9 
27.8  20.1 
24.8  18.8 
10.1  10.3 
10.7  4.8 
1.8  2.0 
10.1  3.1 
11.9  5.2 
38.3  62.3 
2.5  2.1 
7.3  17.8 
15.2  7.7 
73.2  144.2 
22.5  54.2 
16.2  23.4 
20.7  45.5 
10.1  9.7 
221.1  295.9 
Note: P = production; M = imports; E  = exports. 
Table 3.3  Patterns of Production and Trade in the United States 
(1980, billions of U.S. dollars) 
1970  1980 
P  M  E  P  M  E 
31  Food, drink, tobacco  97.0  4.8  2.6  292.3  15.6  12.5 
321 Textiles  26.1  1.2  0.7  61.9  2.6  3.9 
324 Shoes  1.7  0.2  0.1  3.7  1.1  0.5 
33  Wood  17.1  1.1  0.4  51.1  4.9  2.4 
34  Pulp paper  49.0  1.7  1.5  140.0  6.1  5.9 
35  Chemicals  87.5  3.8  5.2  457.0  26.5  29.7 
36  Nonmetallic products  16.0  0.5  0.4  44.0  2.3  1.9 
371 Steel  28.9  2.1  1.3  95.1  8.6  3.3 
372 Nonferrous metals  16.6  1.8  1.0  48.2  8.0  5.5 
38  Metal products  228.0  13.1  21.0  662.7  72.0  97.9 
382 Nonelectrical  machinery  59.2  2.6  8.2  159.8  14.6  38.7 
383 Electrical machinery  43.8  2.5  2.6  94.8  15.4  13.0 
384 Transport equipment  76.8  6.6  7.4  221.4  33.5  32.4 
39  Other manufactures  8.0  1.0  0.4  19.2  4.9  2.8 
3  All manufactures  597.6  33.1  34.8  1,875.2  162.0  167.5 
Note: P = production; M  = imports; E = exports. 
32  Textiles, clothing, leather  49.6  3.2  1.0  105.7  13.0  5.7 
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Table 3.4  Patterns of Production and Trade in Japan 
(1980, billions of U.S. dollars) 
1970  1980 
P  ME  P  M  E 
31  Food, drink, tobacco  22.2  1.1  0.5  116.9  7.2  1.4 
32  Textiles, clothing, leather  14.2  0.5  2.4  50.2  4.2  6.0 
321 Textiles  11.0  0.4  1.8  32.6  2.2  5.2 
322 Clothing  2.3  0.0  0.4  13.0  1.5  0.5 
324 Shoes  0.4  0.0  0.1  2.1  0.2  0.0 
33  Wood  8.5  0.3  0.2  32.6  2.6  0.3 
34  Paper  10.6  0.3  0.2  48.0  1.8  1  .0 
35  Chemicals  26.1  1.8  2.0  16.3  13.7  11.2 
36  Nonmetallic products  6.8  0.1  0.4  31.4  0.4  I .9 
371 Steel  17.3  0.3  2.9  64.1  0.9  15.8 
372 Nonferrous metals  5.3  1.0  0.3  12.8  5.0  2.0 
38  Metal products  76.3  2.8  9.6  320.2  11.5  85.6 
382 Nonelectrical machinery  19.2  1.2  1.9  70.8  3.5  17.3 
383 Electrical machinery  19.5  0.4  2.7  76.0  2.3  21.6 
384 Transport equipment  19.5  0.5  3.6  98.6  2.6  35.7 
39  Other manufactures  2.4  0.2  0.5  12.1  1.2  2.2 
3  All manufactures  189.5  8.5  18.9  851.0  48.6  127.4 
Nore: P = production; M = imports; E = exports. 
and to the strict import restrictions which the European Commission 
administers. These exports are bound to dwindle. Will the EC allow 
itself to become one day a large net importer of steel, as the United 
States has done? 
For textile and clothing products, a sensitive item in trade, the EC 
is more open than the United States. This may be due to the fact that 
the EC tightened its control of these exports only in 1977, several years 
later than the United States. 
The United  States of America is in  balance for chemicals and in 
deficit for everything else except metal goods and electrical equipment, 
the net exports of which cover the other deficits. 
3.2.4  Changes in Trade Shares and International 
Economic Conflicts 
There have been important changes in the trade profiles of the Big 
Three in the 1970s, which have motivated trade tensions. Tables 3.2- 
3.4 reveal two such changes. Similar shifts in the future will bring about 
equally strong pressures for protection. 
One such change has been the extraordinary expansion of Japanese 
exports of capital goods, in particular of  steel, metal goods, and trans- 
port equipment.  Other countries have reacted  to this by demanding 68  Jean Waelbroeck 
that Japan agree to implement voluntary export restraints (VER). The 
other is the sharp deterioration of the three major trading countries’ 
trade balances for textiles and even more for clothing, which reflects 
the surge of exports by NICs; this led the developed countries to impose 
on the developing countries the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). 
Even Japan’s trade reflects this shift in international specialization, 
though it is interesting to note that as late as 1980, there was still a 
textiles and clothing export surplus, a surplus which has provided that 
country with foreign exchange throughout much of its recent history 
(in fact, as late as 1984, Japan was still being “called”  by the United 
States to reduce exports of particular types of textiles, and as late as 
1982, Japan was a larger net exporter of textiles and clothing than Hong 
Kong). The surplus for “other  manufacture^" is another reminder of 
a pattern of comparative advantage which prevailed when Japan was 
still a low-wage country. 
3.2.5  Bilateral Balances and Trade Bargaining 
The imbalance in Japan’s trade in manufactures has evoked a good 
deal of criticism and has often been quoted as proof that this country 
operates an occult system of trade protection. It has contributed in this 
way to the trade tensions of the decade. 
Why should this be considered a problem? Economics tells us that 
there is no reason to demand that trade balance bilaterally for goods 
and services overall, and even less that it should achieve this for one 
category of  goods, such as manufactures. Two hundred  years after 
Adam Smith, however, the mercantilist  illusion is still strong in the 
minds of both the public and trade negotiators, who tend to feel that 
partners with whom their countries have unfavorable trade balances 
are somehow causing harm. It also happens to be true that when two 
countries trade together, the one which is in deficit has a bargaining 
edge, because it can credibly threaten to limit imports from its partner, 
confident that its partner will not be able to inflict upon it equivalent 
harm by retaliating. Japan’s lopsided trade with other developed coun- 
tries has for this reason weakened its bargaining position and helped 
to maintain that country in something of a pariah status in the inter- 
national trading community. The Japanese export surplus with devel- 
oping countries is even larger  of  course; it causes considerable re- 
sentment in the more advanced ones and even brought about a small 
trade war with Taiwan. 
Could the situation be changed by appropriate Japanese policies? 
There is no quick remedy. As indicated, that country needs its export 
surplus in manufactures. What could be envisaged would at best be a 
parallel rise of both exports and imports of manufactures. This increase 
would have to be very large to bring the import/export ratio close to 69  Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries 
the kind of rough balance registered by the EC, for example. Japan’s 
partners, however, would probably be content with a rapid and match- 
ing growth of both exports and imports, which has not been taking 
place. 
The East Asian NICs also have been building up a large surplus in 
their manufactures trade with the EC and the United States. This weak- 
ens their bargaining power for the same reason. This bargaining power 
is also affected by such political factors as the uncertain international 
position of Taiwan, South Korea’s dependence on U.S.  military aid, 
Hong Kong’s status as a British colony that will be ruled by China in 
1997. 
Other developing countries are fortunately in a better position from 
the point of view of bargaining, as nearly all of them import much more 
manufactures from developed countries than they export to them. As 
they begin to export manufactures, they are confronting partners who 
need the outlets which they offer; countries such as Thailand and In- 
donesia have begun to use the threat of cutting down access to their 
markets to fend off protectionist threats to key exports; the current 
debt situation has been used as an argument for moderate protection 
in the United States. 
3.2.6  Are Exports from the South Reaching Market Limits? 
It is frequently asserted that, although the manufactured exports of 
developing countries grew  spectacularly  in  the  past, they  are now 
reaching limits which will slow their progress in the future. Table 3.5 
examines changes of rates of market penetration by developing coun- 
tries into the EC, the United States of America, and Japan. The striking 
finding is that these rates are still very low, except for textiles and 
clothing and miscellaneous manufactured goods. The table  suggests 
that developing countries are still far from having reached what could 
reasonably be thought of as a market ceiling to their exports to the 
developed  countries; the room for further expansion appears to be 
enormous if they can increase and diversify supply.2 
The figures also do away with the widespread idea that competition 
from the NICs has been a major cause of unemployment: the market 
penetration rates are so low that the gross number of workers displaced 
cannot have amounted to a significant fraction of the labor force (as 
explained above, in net terms developing countries have created in- 
dustrial jobs). 
It could be argued that the low level of market penetration rates by 
developing countries into the Big Three traders is an artifact reflecting 
undue aggregation of the data in the tables. It could be true that those 
countries are competitive only for a limited number of products, spread 
over a broad range of SITC items. Market penetration rates would then Table 3.5  Trade of  the EC, the United States, and Japan with Less-developed Countries, excluding Southern Europe (billions of  U.S. 
dollars) 
1970  1980 
Imports  Penetration Rate"  Imports  Penetration Rate" 
EC  U.S.  Japan  EC  U.S.  Japan  EC  U.S.  Japan  EC  U.S.  Japan 
31  Food, drink, tobacco 
32  Textiles, clothing, 
leather 
321  Textiles 
322  Clothing 
324  Shoes 
33  Wood 
34  Paper 
35  Chemicals, petroleum, 
rubber 
351 1 Base chemicals 
353  Refined petroleum 
356  Plastic goods 
36  Nonmetallic products 
371  Steel 
372  Nonferrous metals 
38  Metal products 
39  Other manufactures 
3  All manufactures 
3.5  2.5  0.5  4.4  2.5  2.2  12.6  8.7  2.6  4.5  2.9  2.2 
1.0  1.1  0.3  2.5  2.1  2.3  11.2  9.5  2.6  9.4  8.4  5.4 
0.5  0.4  0.2  2.1  1.3  2.1  3.8  1.3  1.3  5.7  2.1  4.3 
0.3  0.6  0.1  3.1  3.3  3.1  5.6  6.1  1.1  15.3  14.7  7.6 
0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.7  1.3  0.2  7.0  20.4  6.9 
I .o  0.3  0.3  0.1  1.9  1.5  1  .o  2.1  1.4  0.7 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.47  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.4 
0.6  1.7  0.7  0.9  2.0  2.6  10.3  13.7  7.4  3.3  3.0  4.5 
3.8  2.7 
0.2  0.1  0.0  1.3  0.9  0.8  1.5  0.7  0.5  2.9  1.0  2.1 
0.2  1.3  0.6  1.5  5.4  12.4  7.6  10.9  6.4  6.8  5.1  10.6 
0.0  0.2  0.0  0.7  2.4  0.1  0.5  1.1  0.3  1.8  3.1  0.4 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.1  0.5  0.9  0.3 
0.2  0.07  0.07  0.6  0.2  0.5  0.8  1  .o  0.5  0.9  1.0  1.1 
2.2  0.5  0.6  15.8  3.0  9.7  5.2  2.6  2.3  12.4  5.1  14.4 
0.5  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.1  8.7  11.8  1.5  1.8  2.0  0.6 
0.6  0.3  0.1  16.9  3.8  2.8  6.2  2.1  0.5  41.2  10.0  4.5 
3.7  7.2  2.4  2.2  1.2  1.3  50.0  51.4  18.5  3.3  2.8  2.4 
aImports as percentage of apparent consumption. 71  Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries 
be low for the aggregates just discussed and yet be quite high for the 
products which developing countries  are capable of  exporting. It is 
worthwhile to look at more detailed data. Table 3.6 lists the goods for 
which the rate of market penetration is 10% or more, at the finest level 
of disaggregation available (four or five digits ISIC). 
The detailed table confirms the earlier conclusions. More than half 
the items are textiles and clothing products, a group where the market 
penetration rate is high at an aggregated level. Three are food products, 
which are vulnerable to the agricultural protectionism that is rampant 
throughout  the world.  Others (nonferrous metals, jewelry including 
diamonds, and leather) are largely raw materials. These have usually 
been subjected to protection only to a limited extent; as such products 
tend to have rather perfect markets and the developing-countries’ share 
is not high in most cases, they are not threatened by market saturation 
constraints (the case of diamonds, subject to marketing decisions of 
the Diamond Trading Corporation cartel, is discussed below). The table 
does not reveal any unsuspected danger points: the conclusion stands 
that there is a good deal of room for increase of exports of manufactures 
from developing to developed countries provided that developing coun- 
tries, as they have managed to do up to now, are flexible enough to 
shift to new products as some existing markets close up. 
3.3  The EC Common Commercial Policy, the Trade Policies of 
Member Countries of the EC, and the Design of Trade Policies 
for Developing Countries 
Does the EC offer to developing countries a unified market? Does 
the EC have a trade policy of its own? Given the threat of protection, 
it is important for developing countries to give thought to identifying 
the most effective negotiating strategy in dealing with the EC. 
In principle, what the EC offers to developing countries is indeed a 
common market. There is a common external tariff. Most of the overt 
quantitative restrictions which existed in 1958 when the Rome Treaty 
was signed have been abolished. The European Commission represents 
member country governments in negotiations. To regard the Commu- 
nity as an entity for purposes of  trade negotiations would  seem the 
right basis for policy thinking. 
A closer look reveals, however, that member countries retain a good 
deal of freedom to control access to their markets. Of the few import 
quotas which these countries still administer, some are important, for 
example, those for automobiles in Italy and for consumer electronics 
in some countries. Even the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and the steel 
import restraints administered by the commission under Article 58 of 
the Rome Treaty provide for national import quotas and leave to the Table 3.6  High Market Penetration Items in Developed-Country Imports* from Developing Countries (imports as percentage of apparent 
consumption) 
~~ 
EC  United States  Japan 
1970  1980  1970  1980  1970  1980 
3115 
fats 
31 16  Grain products 
3118  Sugar products 
321 1-1 Cotton fabrics 
321 1-7 Fiber for textile use 
3214-1 Knotted carpets 
3215  Cordage, rope, twine 
3220-2 Women’s, girls’, infants’ 
3220-3 Underwear 
3220-4 Leather apparel 
3220-5 Headgear 
3220-6 Knitted apparel 
3231  Tanned, finished leather 
3232  Furs 
3233  Manufactured leather 
3240  Footwear 
3720-3 Other nonferrous metals 
3853  Watches and clocks 
3901  Jewelry 
3909-2 Toys, ornaments 
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discretion of member countries some important decisions about im- 
ports. Subsidies to producers are a very important form of “nonborder 
protection”; except for agricultural products, they are granted almost 
exclusively  at the discretion of  individual governments, though  the 
commission can and does try to limit them, to the extent that “political 
realities”  make this feasible. 
It should also be remembered that it is the member countries who, 
in the EC Council, set down the instructions which define the com- 
mission’s bargaining stance on such occasions as the renewal of the 
MFA. These terms of reference, often agreed to after an excruciatingly 
slow debate in the EC Council, tend to be so rigid that there is little 
choice for the other party: they must agree or face the risk of a trade 
war. 
All of this suggests that if developing countries are to be successful 
in  increasing exports at the rate which their  development requires, 
they should start from the premise that the effective decision makers 
for trade policy remain member country governments. The EC pro- 
cedures are basically a convenient way of pooling the member coun- 
tries’  bargaining power.  It  is to the task  of  persuading  these gov- 
ernments to accept their exports that they should devote their main 
efforts. 
The  figures provided  in  table  3.7 in  fact  suggest  that  twenty-six 
years after the Rome Treaty was signed, the various national markets 
in the EC are not yet equally open to developing nations. It will be 
argued  here that  these differences reflect  structural factors only to 
a limited extent. The main reason for the differences in openness is 
the  control  which governments continue to exercise  on access to 
domestic markets. 
We  start with a discussion  of  differences  which reflect  structural 
factors. The Dutch and Belgian figures for imports of textiles and cloth- 
ing are a clear example of this. Benelux is a single trading area from 
the point of view of the administration of the EC MFA regulations, yet 
developing countries have achieved much higher penetration  of  the 
Dutch than of the Belgian market. This is because of the greater strength 
of the Belgian industry. The large United Kingdom and Belgian imports 
of “other manufactures” are dominated by diamonds, which the former 
redistributes to diamond cutters throughout the world, while the latter 
does the processing itself. Belgium’s imports of nonferrous metals re- 
flect historical links with Zaire, which are gradually getting weaker. 
The Netherlands, a large producer of animal feeds and products made 
from vegetable oils, imports for this reason large quantities of cassava 
pellets, oilseed cakes, and oils, which account for its large imports of 
“food, drink, and tobacco.” 
Country trade  policies  are clearly  also at work  however:  the re- 
markable match between the figures on openness of different markets Table 3.7  Openness of Different EC Countries to Imports from developing Countries (imports as % of apparent consumption) 






1970  1980  1970  1980  1970  1980  1970  1980  1970  1980  1970  1980 
31  Food, drink, tobacco  5.4  5.5  6.4  5.1  8.3  8.3  4.1  4.2  3.5  2.9  3.4  4.3 
32  Textiles, clothing,  2.6  11.2  2.5  9.9  3.3  15.2  1.1  5.7  4.1  10.4  1.9  7.9 
leather (including 
shoes) 
35  Chemicals  0.5  2.5  0.8  5.4  3.9  9.3  3.9  2.8  1.9  1.6  9.6  5.3 
38  Metal products  0.2  2.2  0.4  1.2  2.4  2.1  0.1  1.0  0.6  3.0  0.2  1.1 
372 Nonferrous metals  9.8  10.9  138.9  44.6  9.4  9.8  10.3  7.8  14.6  12.6  21.3  14.6 
39  Other manufactures  7.3  8.8  300  34.5  111.1  12.3  2.2  7.5  69.3  160.0  2.2  28.3 
3  All manufactures  1.8  3.4  5.2  5.1  4.3  6.0  1.6  2  2.8  2.5  1.6  3.6 
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in table 3.7 and what is known of the underlying trade policy stance 
of different countries cannot be accidental. 
Who the protectionist and nonprotectionist members of the EC are 
is not  difficult to find out: the EC Council alignment in debates of 
trade policy for manufactures never varies. The Netherlands, the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, and Denmark are for free trade, and the 
United Kingdom, France, and Italy for a restrictive policy, with Bel- 
gium liking protection instinctively but held back by Benelux loyalties. 
These attitudes are remarkably immune to political shifts. It had been 
feared  that  France would  become  even more  protectionist  when a 
popular-front government was elected which advocated “reconquest 
of the domestic market,”  but this did not happen; the liberal convic- 
tions  of  Britain’s  Mrs.  Thatcher  should  have  tilted  that  country’s 
attitude in favor of free trade, but this turned out not to be true. Trade 
policy  appears to reflect  a kind  of modus vivendi between  interest 
groups, the bureaucracy, and what in France is called the “political 
class,”  which does not depend very much on the changing fortunes 
of parties. 
The match between openness and trade policy preference is quite 
apparent in the figures for imports of “textiles, clothing, leather.” These 
imports are influenced by key decisions on administration of the MFA, 
which individual governments continue to control, and are also affected 
by the VER agreements for shoes which some governments have ne- 
gotiated outside the EC framework. France is by a substantial margin 
the most closed country, while the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Netherlands are very open. 
It is particularly interesting to notice that the United Kingdom, which 
was relatively open to imports from the South in 1970, became rela- 
tively closed ten years later. In the early postwar years, that country 
accepted very liberally imports of manufactures from the Common- 
wealth members of the developing world, but its import policy  has 
gradually become more restrictive.  In recent years, it has been exer- 
cising to the fullest possible extent its rights to limit imports under the 
EC version of the MFA and has in addition pressured low-wage sup- 
pliers into accepting VER agreements for such goods as television sets 
and shoes. The low growth of U.K. imports in the table reflects this 
gradual policy shift. 
The key to success in trade negotiations is to apply diplomacy at the 
right time and to the right target. Developing countries feel that they 
have so far been doing poorly in disputes with the EC. Perhaps they 
would do better if they used their power of persuasion and bargaining 
strength to deal with the true source of their problems: the countries 
who in the EC Council argue most strongly in favor of restrictions to 
their exports. 76  Jean Waelbroeck 
3.4  The Comparative Advantage of the South in the EC Market: 
An Attempt at a Diagnosis 
This section examines in detail the export performance of developing 
countries  with  respect  to the  EC  market.  An  attempt  is  made  to 
identify  the products  for which  developing countries have  a com- 
parative  advantage and to  assess  the  risk  that  exploitation  of  this 
advantage  will  be thwarted  by  protection.  The judgment  will  draw 
on  the  work  of  the  European  Group for Research  on  Protection, 
organized in the framework of the World  Bank research project  on 
which this paper is based.3 
The largest group of the manufactured exports from developing coun- 
tries to the EC has traditionally consisted of resource-intensive prod- 
ucts, a consequence of Europe’s lack of natural resources. Most of the 
other exports consist of unskilled-labor-intensive  products, again re- 
flecting the relative conditions in developing countries and in Europe. 
Physical capital intensity, on the other hand, does appear to have a 
clear-cut impact on the competitiveness of the South. Perhaps, in con- 
trast to the human sort, this capital is mobile enough to equalize returns 
across countries, so that the amount available does not influence costs 
of production to an appreciable e~tent.~ 
There have been indications in recent years that the more advanced 
of the NICs have been acquiring a comparative advantage for the prod- 
ucts of yet a third group of industries. These are sectors characterized 
by large-scale production, mature technology (which is thus more readily 
acquired than that of other sectors), and automation (which has made 
irrelevant labor skills that used to be vital to production). The chief 
examples are the shipbuilding, steel, and automobile industries. The 
main constraint is that a high level of industrial competence is required 
for competitive production-the  developing world is strewn with in- 
efficient steel mills, which were built for national pride or because it 
was believed that they would turn out to be poles of growth for other 
industries. 
These three industries require quite a bit of  capital but also much 
labor. The large size of plants has meant that, in developed countries, 
unions are very strong and in these plants, which have far above average 
wage levels and/or a great deal of job padding; these “endogenous 
distortions,” as Bhagwati’s (1971) well-known classification labels them, 
have provided countries where unions are not so powerful or where, 
as in Japan,  they  cooperate better  with employers with  a clear-cut 
comparative advantage in these industries. 
Most of the discussion in this  section is devoted to the first two 
sources of comparative advantage. A brief subsection is devoted to the 
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3.4.1  Simply Transformed Primary Products 
About half of developing-countries’ exports of manufactures to the 
developed countries have traditionally been made up of  primary prod- 
ucts, exported after simple processing, which in most cases added little 
value to the goods. Such products are manufactures only statistically. 
(This of course does not mean that their export is less worthwhile than 
that of  “true manufactured goods.”) Table 3.8 provides data on these 
exports. 
This category is dominated by three categories of products-vege- 
table oils and fats, nonferrous metals, and  jewelry (largely diamonds)- 
which together account for two-thirds of the total.  Imports of forest 
products have been growing particularly quickly, a trend which can be 
expected to continue as more and more developing countries decide 
to prohibit export of timber in the round. Basic chemicals are included 
in the table because developing countries tend to sell largely crude or 
barely elaborated products. Basic chemical sales have tended to grow 
quite quickly, and there exists a potential for quite a lot more growth 
if developing countries are quick to seize market opportunities. 
The table suggests that the share of crudely elaborated materials in 
the South’s exports of  manufactures  has not been decreasing.  This 
category accounted for 55%  of developing-countries’ exports to the 
EC in 1970; by 1980 the proportion was 53%,  a negligible drop. 
This apparent stability is misleading, however.  Refined petroleum 
should be considered separately. Here the extremely quick growth of 
Table 3.8  “Barely Transformed Primary Products” in EC Imports 
of Manufactures from Developing Countries 
(millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Imports  Penetration Rate” 
1970  1980  1970  1980 
3115  Vegetable and animal oils and fats  842 
31 18  Sugar products  284 
3211-7 Fiber for textile use  94 
3231  Tanned, finished leather  114 
3311-1 Sawn lumber, etc.  167 
33 11-2 Veneer plywood, etc.  62 
35 1  1  Basic chemicals  196 
3720  Nonferrous metals  2,223 
353  Refined petroleum  220 
3901  Jewelry  559 












17.8  20.3 
9.9  11.5 
13.0  21.9 
9.5  13.9 
6.1  11.9 
5.4  10.4 
2.0  2.9 
1.5  6.8 
15.8  12.4 
79.6  111.8 
Note: Southern Europe is not included in the developing world. 
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oil exports is to a large extent a price phenomenon. The efforts of oil- 
exporting countries to refine their own oil were another contributing 
factor. Removing oil from the total focuses attention on the products 
which are of interest mainly to oil-importing developing countries. When 
this is done, the proportion of crudely elaborated materials in devel- 
oping-country exports to the EC changes to 52%  in 1970 and to 38% 
in  1980, a substantial drop. Resource-based manufactures have thus 
accounted for a steadily falling fraction of the South’s exports of man- 
ufactured goods to the EC. 
Sales of most of those commodities are supply, rather than demand, 
determined.  An exceptions is sugar, the export of which is narrowly 
restricted by the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy and by the Lome 
Agreement, which allow a limited number of African and Caribbean 
countries to export to the EC fixed quantities of a good of which the 
EC is a very large net exporter: this is an artificial trade which will not 
expand. For diamonds, sales are controlled by the Diamond Trading 
Corporation cartel, but countries that find new deposits have always 
obtained quotas for the newly obtained output: here supply is what 
determines exports. Protection of vegetable oils may increase as the 
EC seeks to find room for Spanish olive oil after that country joins the 
EC-but  a long transition period will postpone the problem for quite 
a few years. Here the United States is both a powerful competitor of 
developing-country vegetable oil exporters and a strong ally, which has 
so far been able to  use its bargaining power to prevent higher protection. 
3.4.2  Unskilled-Labor-Intensive  Products 
Textiles, Clothing, Shoes 
Exports of textiles, clothing, and shoes account for a fifth of  the 
exports of  manufactures by  developing countries  to the  developed 
countries and have been another mainstay of their export drive. These 
are the exports hit hardest by protection. The system of  restriction 
contained  in the MFA for textiles and clothing is very elaborate. In 
addition, the  EC has  concluded agreements outside the MFA  with 
Mediterranean countries and with prospective EC entrants; these have 
been  somewhat more  generous,  especially the agreements with  the 
latter countries. Lome countries (former colonies in Africa and islands 
in the Caribbean and the Pacific) are also treated separately. They are 
not yet significant exporters, and in most cases the EC has not bothered 
to impose elaborate agreements. They do not enjoy a privileged market 
access, however. As soon as Mauritius, a Lome country, managed to 
develop small exports of some textiles and clothing articles, it found 
that it had to limit its exports to the EC. 
How watertight is the system? It is in principle very restrictive, but 
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The VER agreements define ceilings to the quantities that may be 
exported. However, countries may increase the value of their exports 
by  exporting higher-quality or more highly processed goods, a shift 
that can increase the unit value of exports severalfold. 
Also, the smaller and newer exporters of textiles and clothing are 
less tightly controlled than Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the so- 
called textile NICs. Most of the secondary exporters do not use their 
quotas fully-India  is notorious as a country that is not competitive 
enough to use its quotas, in spite of wages that are among the lowest 
in the world.  Fairly rapid growth is possible for such secondary ex- 
porters if they find ways of exporting successfully on a world market 
where competition is very hard; an easy way to do so is to invite foreign 
direct investment from the textile NICs, as Sri Lanka and Mauritius 
have done, for example. 
The EC’s agreements with Mediterranean countries are not as wa- 
tertight as the others, and those countries have benefited from higher 
permitted growth rates of exports and from looser agreements. Tur- 
key-a  prospective entrant-has  refused quite successfully to sign any 
general agreement and has gone on to build up exports using every 
trick in the rule book and some which the book does not describe. Of 
course, a good deal of cheating goes on, only a small fraction of which 
is detected. 
An interesting way of viewing the MFA is to regard it as a kind of 
customs union that shelters the developed market economies behind a 
common wall of protection. The situation is quite clear-cut. There are 
special cases as always. Japan is one: it is a “developed country” that 
does not make use of its MFA rights and is “called,”  like a developing 
country, to restrict exports to the United States. Switzerland does not 
protect its market by quotas or VER agreements, though it does nmake 
use of more informal protective devices. Apart from such cases, the 
customs union interpretation is valid. The world is indeed split between 
a protected market sheltered by discriminatory protection and an “open” 
market  elsewhere, where tariff walls may  be very  high but  are not 
discriminatory. 
Trade theory leads us to expect that such a union should affect trade 
in well-defined ways. If the discriminatory protection is effective, ex- 
ports of the customs union producers to third countries should drop if 
protection increases, as it raises prices on the protected market above 
the world level; union producers should obtain a rising share of the 
union’s imports as trade diversion occurs. Has this happened? 
MFA  protection  was tightened  a great deal during the  1970s: the 
“customs  union  of  rich  countries”  has become more closed to the 
outside world. Yet table 3.9 does not reveal the strong changes in the 
orientation of trade flows that would be expected. There was a swift 
growth of imports from low-wage countries into the EC but also of Table 3.9  EC Trade in  MFA Goods (millions of  U.S. dollars) 
1970  1980 
Textiles  Clothing  Textiles  Clothing 
User  Source  User  Source  User  Source  User  Source 
Exports/imports 
Developed countriesa  1,823  740  625  220  5,079  4,363  3,246  1,615 
Developing countriesb  1,261  770  237  550  5,237  5,780  1,516  9,129 
Total  3,084  1,510  862  770  10,336  10,143  4,762  10,744 
Apparent consumption of  respective  24,602  26,179  10,487  10,579  66,007  66,200  36,541  30,559 
product 
aDeveloped countries, excluding southern Europe and intra-EC trade, as users of EC textile and clothing exports and source 
of  textile and clothing imports into the EC. 
bDeveloping countries, including southern Europe and CPEs, as users of  EC textile and clothing exports and source of  textile 
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exports to that part of the world. For textiles, in fact, EC exports to 
the “open” market grew even faster than exports to the protected one. 
The latter result is especially surprising: it implies that even today, EC 
producers remain able to compete on world markets for many products: 
adaptation to a more open trading system should be possible and per- 
haps not difficult for these firms. It is true that for the so-called highly 
sensitive goods, the competitive edge of the textile NICs remains over- 
whelming. But the rates of market penetration for these goods are quite 
high already: much of the adjustment that would result from more open 
trade has already taken place. 
There is a good deal of “water” in the MFA system, therefore; some 
of the protection that a busy and politically powerful industry lobby 
has won is not really needed. 
It is interesting to speculate that the lack of impact of protection on 
trade flows also reflects a decline in the comparative advantage of the 
textile NICs for their traditional products. This would be the result of 
both  technological and economic changes. The textiles industry has 
been undergoing extraordinary technological change, which has slowly 
turned it into an industry that is quite capital-intensive, thanks to au- 
tomation, which made it possible for workers to supervise even greater 
numbers of spinning and weaving looms. Cheap labor is less important 
for competitiveness than it used to be. A similar revolution is beginning 
today in the clothing industry (especially for the standardized products, 
where the competitive strength of low-wage producers has been great- 
est) as computer-controlled devices begin to be widespread. 
Very  swift economic change is reinforcing the effect of this tech- 
nological revolution. Wages in the textile NICs have risen dramatically: 
the wage rate in Korea, a country that was as poor as India thirty-five 
years ago, exceeded that in Portugal by 50% in 1983; the wage rate in 
the other textile NICs was similar. Yet Portugal has been accepted as 
a member of the EC-though  not without a transition period that shields 
other EC producers from its exports. 
From an economic point of view, the present time seems to offer a 
unique  opportunity to experiment with liberalization of  textiles and 
clothing imports. The next renegotiation of the MFA would be the right 
time for this. The textiles and clothing lobby has acquired such political 
power over the years, however, that it would be risky to plan on even 
limited trade liberalization in textiles and clothing. 
Table 3.10 provides more detailed information on the pattern of EC 
trade for textiles, clothing, and shoes. A first question is inspired by 
Balassa’s (1979) concept of  “stages  of  comparative advantage,”  ac- 
cording to which countries that start on the road to development begin 
by exporting simple unskilled-labor-intensive goods and then shift to 
products that embody more human and physical capital as  development lsble 3.10  Percentage of Imports in Apparent Consumption in the EC 
Textiles  Clothing  Shoes 
1970  1975  1980  1970  1975  1980  1970  1975  1980 
East Asian NICs  0.43  0.85  0.99  2.70  7.01  9.32  0.72  1.25  4.01 
Other developing countries"  1.67  2.59  4.74  0.40  1.98  6.02  0.27  1.13  2.98 
Southern Europe  0.70  1.39  2.40  1.34  4.57  7.07  0.83  3.59  5.85 
Italy  1.99  2.98  3.88  5.19  6.05  8.42  6.88  15.13  21.50 
Japan  0.30  0.24  0.50  0.24  0.13  1.65  0.14  0.10  0.04 
Other suppliers  94.91  91.95  87.49  90.13  80.26  67.52  91.16  78.79  65.62 
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increases their endowment of  those factors. This opens the way for 
countries that begin to develop later to take over the markets relin- 
quished by their seniors. 
Has the process been  working? For  the EC market, at least, the 
answer so far is negative. Even today the textile NICs can produce 
textiles and clothing at lower cost than other developing countries, the 
very great majority of which have not managed to exploit the com- 
petitive edge that their lower wage levels might provide. That the ex- 
ports  of  the  textile  NICs grew less than those of  other developing 
countries is due to stricter protection. 
Could it be that when they began to enter world markets, their own 
success was eased by a conveniently timed withdrawal of Japan, which 
by that time was ceasing to be a low-wage country? The figures do not 
suggest this. The Japanese withdrawal from the European market was 
complete in  1970, whereas the major increase in developing-country 
exports of  textile and clothing articles took place after that date. 
The hypothesis might perhaps be vindicated by a more disaggregated 
look. Both Japan and the textile NICs have shifted to higher-quality 
goods as their industrial skills grew; they have been encouraged to do 
so both by the working of market forces and by the fact that trade 
restrictions have been specified in quantities, so that it was profitable 
to export goods with higher unit values. It is possible that this strategy 
is leaving open easy “beginners’ markets,” facilitating the market entry 
of less experienced exporters today, such as China for instance. The 
low unit values of  Chinese exports would suggest this. Verifying this 
conjecture would constitute an interesting research project. 
Another question on which the table is designed to shed light is the 
degree to which trade diversion may have been caused by trade re- 
straints. The tightening of MFA controls by the EC in 1977 was a boon 
to Italy, the lowest-wage country in the EC and an efficient producer 
of  textiles and clothing. Table 3.10 illustrates the sharp export gains 
achieved by that country between 1975 and 1980. Trade diversion to 
low-wage member countries can be expected to increase with the entry 
of Greece, Portugal, and Spain into the EC. Greece, which conducted 
a very protectionist trade policy before it entered the EC, had not felt 
it necessary to impose MFA-type controls on imports of  textiles and 
clothing from the South; this shows how competitively it is able to 
produce these goods. The competitiveness of Portugal is better known. 
Again, the point should not be overstressed. The shift in the pattern 
of Italian trade was not only due to trade diversion; another structural 
distortion was at work. In the 1970s, large-scale industry in that country 
was  heavily handicapped  by  social legislation, which enabled  trade 
unions to block measures of rationalization and to force enterprises to 
retain excess labor almost indefinitely; the large state-run sector went 84  Jean Waelbroeck 
through a management crisis. This shifted the pattern of comparative 
advantage in favor of small-scale industries. Many small firms within 
the so-called submerged economy have in addition managed to escape 
paying taxes and social security contributions. Similar distortions exist 
in  Spain and Portugal, which will strengthen the tendency  of  these 
countries to take over markets for textiles, clothing, and shoes. 
Japan remains competitive enough to make it hard for the NICs to 
breach its domestic market. That country does not make use of the 
VER agreements of the MFA, though it has used the threat of anti- 
dumping duties to convince Korea and Pakistan, for instance, to restrict 
exports of  some sensitive products.  The very rapid rise of  its wage 
level should have led Japan to lose competitiveness rapidly in textiles, 
clothing, and shoes, and a high rate of  increase of the rate of market 
penetration should have taken place. Interestingly, the increase of mar- 
ket penetration for these products has been lower than in Korea and 
Pakistan; but only for shoes is this obviously a result of protection. 
The competitiveness of domestic producers again explains why the 
rate of market penetration into the EC domestic market for shoes is 
much lower than into the U.S.  market. There are VER agreements 
between some countries of the EC and the main developing-country 
exporters of shoes, but these are not tight enough to have much effect: 
what has limited imports is the competitiveness of Italian  shoe pro- 
ducers, who are so efficient that, like East Asian producers, they were 
subjected at times by the United States to VERs. 
The most striking finding is, however, that everywhere both exports 
and imports of these goods rose much faster than production.  This 
striking shift to greater openness to trade must be seen as one of the 
most important structural changes of the 1970s, to which many pro- 
ducers must have found it difficult to adjust. This must have increased 
pressures for protection. 
In ten years, clothing and shoes switched from being goods that were 
little traded to goods that are very open to trade. A sophisticated trading 
system has also come into being, encouraged by lower transportation 
and communication costs as well as by General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) tariff reductions. Even the MFA has stimulated the 
growth of this network, because the system of regulations which the 
MFA defines is so complex that it places a premium on the acquisition 
of  specialized trading skills. This paradoxical situation in which dis- 
criminatory protection  can increase trade could be interpreted  in  a 
second-best framework. 
Miscellaneous Light Manufactures 
In the future, protection will limit the growth of developing-countries’ 
exports of  textiles  and clothing, and possibly  also of  shoes.  These 85  Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries 
countries will have to identify other products, the markets for which 
remain open. What other goods are there for which developing coun- 
tries have demonstrated a comparative advantage? Is there room for 
further growth  of  their exports? Does the list of  such goods tell us 
something about the markets which they are likely to enter in coming 
years? 
Table 3.11 provides figures that are relevant. The goods listed are 
light industrial goods whose exports were significant in  1980. 
What is striking is the wide range of items listed in the table, from 
brooms and brushes to computers. Exports of each type of such goods 
are not large, but the aggregate volume is impressive: $7,387 million, 
Table 3.11  Minor Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries to the 
EC (millions of U.S.  dollars) 
EC Imports  Penetration Ratea 
1970  1980  1970  1980 
3 11  3 
3114  Fish preservers 
31 19  Cocoa, chocolate, confectionery 
3232  Furs prepared, not sewn 
3319  Miscellaneous goods from wood 
3320  Nonmetallic furniture 
3420-2 Printing, etc. 
3551  Tires 
3559  Other rubbergoods 
356  Miscellaneous plastic goods 
3610  Porcelain,  ceramics, etc. 
3811-1 Cutlery 
381 1-2 Hand tools, other hardware 
3819-2 Metal containers 
3825-  1 Office equipment except computers 
3825-2 Computers 
3829  Miscellaneous nonelectrical  machinery 
3832-1 Radio and TV equipment 
3833  Electrical household durables 
3839  Batteries, lamps, etc. 
3852-3 Photographic equipment 
3853  Watches and clocks 
3902  Music instruments 
3903  Sport goods 
3909-4 Brooms, brushes 
3909-5 Umbrellas, pipes, etc. 

















































































































Note: Excluding southern Europe. 
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half the value of clothing exports. In quite a few instances, exports 
were negligible fifteen years ago: these exports were “invented” quite 
recently, as entrepreneurs identified items that could be produced at 
low cost given the cost structure of developing countries. 
The list is made up entirely of unskilled-labor-intensive goods, as 
economic theory would predict. In some cases, the exports were “in- 
vented”  by multinationals, who saw that it was profitable to shift to 
low-wage countries for the unskilled-labor-intensive stages of the pro- 
duction process. Examples are computers and television sets (in the 
more advanced NICs there are also local companies producing tele- 
vision sets and other consumer electronics items, and even [copied] 
microcomputers).  In the majority  of  cases, however, it  is the local 
entrepreneurs who have developed the new exports. 
As often happens, this neoclassical interpretation of the list of suc- 
cessful exports can be replaced by a neotechnological interpretation. 
Production of most of the items in the table requires only a limited 
industrial competence (Westphal, Rhee, and Purse11 1981): the apparent 
exceptions are largely produced by multinationals, which provide the 
skilled  staff and know-how  and locate the unskilled-labor-intensive 
stages of  production  in  developing countries.  Proponents of  a neo- 
technological  view of international trade could stress that the goods 
developing countries are able to produce efficiently are those whose 
production does not require hard-to-obtain technology or the organi- 
zational skills required for large-scale production  and which can be 
marketed without needing to set up an elaborate international marketing 
network. To the extent that building up human capital is necessary to 
the acquisition of industrial competence, it is not surprising that the 
neotechnological and neoclassical  interpretations  are hard to distin- 
guish.  They are not equivalent of  course:  sending young people to 
school does not suffice to procure the industrial competence which a 
country may need. (Westphal, Rhee, and Purcell make the interesting 
point that an outward-oriented strategy, which introduces the challenge 
of  competition  on world  markets,  is crucial to achieving industrial 
competence  .) 
For a few products, the rate of market penetration has become rather 
high, and exports could encounter absorption limits and possibly new 
protection  barriers  (preserves,  furs,  cutlery,  radios  and  television 
equipment, watches  and  clocks,  sporting goods,  umbrellas,  for in- 
stance). The econometric work of the European Group for Research 
on Protection suggests, however, that these minor industries find that 
the tight protection obtained by larger and more politically powerful 
sectors (like textiles and agriculture) is difficult to extract from policy 
makers for themselves. This warrants optimism about the continued 
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France for quite a few of these goods, but access to other EC markets 
is quite free (and smuggling into France is easy). 
The list  should,  however, be looked  on mainly as indicating  the 
products in which developing countries potentially have a comparative 
advantage. Many of these exports were only recently “invented”; there 
will be more such discoveries. Industrial competence has been a lim- 
iting factor, but its acquisition is a cumulative process: the range of 
goods which developing countries are able to produce efficiently will 
become even broader, enabling further diversification of exports. 
3.4.3  The Troubled Mature Trade-Union-Intensive Industries 
Finally we will discuss the participation of developing countries in 
the troubled “new mature industries”: shipbuilding, automobiles, and 
steel (see table 3.12). Production of these goods requires complex tech- 
nology and skill in running complex industrial operations, which quite 
a few of  the more advanced NICs have acquired by now. Technology 
for steel and shipbuilding is available fairly freely. Efficient producers 
of  automobiles in the developing world  are subsidiaries of  multina- 
tionals. They are beginning to export to a greater extent as their owners 
pursue “world car strategies”; one of the two large Korean industrial 
groups has been able to develop a model and to produce it fairly ef- 
fectively. Other countries, such as India, are starting to develop au- 
tomobile industries. They are acquiring the right to produce models 
developed elsewhere and are obtaining assistance and some capital 
funds for building the necessary plants. (The CPEs were pioneers in 
this development but have had only moderate success. The number of 
cars exported by the CPEs to the EC is of the same order of magnitude 
as the Japanese total, but the quality is very poor and unit prices are 
low.) 
Exports of these three categories of goods by developing countries 
were negligible in 1980. For steel, the situation is not likely to change 
fast.  Imports from third  countries  into the EC are limited by VER 
agreements, which are not likely to be lifted soon; trading partners 
who have refused to conclude such agreements have been hit by an- 
Table 3.U  EC Imports from Developing Countries (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Imports  Penetration Rate 
1970  1980  1970  1980 
371  Steel  195  815  0.6  0.9 
3841 Shipbuilding  10  762  0.4  7.6 
3843 Automobiles  8  449  0.0  0.4 
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tidumping duties. Meanwhile the EC, which itself resorts to dumping 
on world markets, is a competitor to be reckoned with on third coun- 
tries’ markets, as is Japan’s highly efficient steel industry. 
Union  power in the EC has  had  a disastrous  effect on the  steel 
industry by preventing adjustment of the labor force and of capacity, 
but it has also forced member country governments and the EC Council 
to grant very large subsidies and to virtually close the domestic market 
to imports. The “endogenous distortion” has been offset by an equally 
endogenous tariff,  which negates the comparative advantage of  the 
foreign producers.  Such a situation cannot continue indefinitely, and 
often-postponed capacity cuts of over thirty million tons were finally 
agreed to in 1983. 
In the long run, there will be no surge of import demand for steel in 
the Common Market and no sudden decrease in the low-priced exports 
of  EC producers to the rest of the world, unless the business cycle 
situation improves a good deal more than now seems probable. But 
over time, the most developed of the NICs are likely to become grad- 
ually significant exporters of steel. The world market is very large: the 
steel exports of the Big Three traders amounted to nearly $35 billion 
in 1980; even if access to their domestic markets is denied by protection, 
Europe’s steel producers will be slowly displaced from their export 
markets. 
The EC shipbuilding industry is dying rapidly; more than half of the 
jobs which existed in  1973 have been shed during the recession, and 
the contraction of  the industry continues steadily. Here also the true 
competitor of developing countries is Japan. Korea, a small producer 
until a few years ago, has been winning a fifth of world new orders in 
recent months; there is reason to think that this “infant export” has 
had a high cost in covert subsidies. Protection in the EC is of little 
avail to Europe’s shipyards. Since shipping is a world industry, tariffs 
would not be effective. And EC shipyards, which in some recent in- 
stances have quoted prices that were three times as high as the Korean 
ones, can be kept going only by subsidies that are so prohibitive that 
governments are not willing to continue to give them indefinitely. The 
industry, which is much smaller than steel, does not have the political 
weight required to win the protection which it needs to survive. 
For automobiles also, prospects depend on a complex interplay among 
trade unions, multinationals, and the governments of both developed 
and developing countries. The world market is extremely large, and 
enormous export opportunities would be created for the developing 
countries by breaking into the automobile market-f  course, this would 
entail severe competition  with Japan.  In the developed world tariff 
walls are of the same order of magnitude as for textiles; in developing- 
country markets, auto imports are limited by tariffs and domestic con- 
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In contrast with the situation for steel and shipbuilding, there is no 
unified lobby arguing for protection  of the automobile industry.  Au- 
tomobile companies have found it advantageous to produce the same 
car in different places, in part to make themselves less vulnerable to 
trade union pressures but also to amortize the extremely high setting- 
up costs which launching a new model entails.  A  good deal of the 
exports of developing countries is short term in nature; for example, 
the recession in Brazil has led to substantial exports of cars that could 
not be disposed of domestically. Another part reflects commitments by 
producers to earn foreign exchange in return for the grant of a privileged 
market access. The fact that so much of the trade between the devel- 
oped and the developing countries will consist of intrafirm trade will 
check the rise of protection. However, except for Korea, there is as 
yet no growth of  production in the South that is both clearly export- 
oriented and successful. 
In conclusion, there will be no breakthrough in the three industries 
to match that which the South (and in particular the Far Eastern NICs) 
achieved for clothing in the 1970s. The coming years should, however, 
witness steady growth of exports of these products. These markets are 
so large that the winning of even only small fractions of them could 
yield substantial amounts of foreign exchange. 
3.5  Conclusion 
Using a new data set, this paper  has discussed export trends for 
manufactures  from the South to the European Community and has 
drawn implications for future prospects and for policy. 
Comparison of  the Big Three trading nations (the United  States, 
Japan, and the EC) reveals the United States as the biggest producer 
and consumer of manufactures. As a trader, the EC makes up for this 
by being more open to imports, both globally and from developing 
countries. Japan has a more closed market. The figures reveal clearly 
the market shifts that have caused tensions in the 1970s: the swift gains 
in shares by the East Asian NICs, in particular, for textiles and clothing 
and by Japan for steel, automobiles, and some other metal goods. Both 
Japan and the East Asian NICs have a large export surplus with the 
United States of America and Europe, and this has lessened their ability 
to seek arrangements that might check the increase of protection. The 
so-called new NICs, the developing countries which are beginning to 
export manufactures today, are in a more favorable position from this 
point of view and are net creators of manufacturing jobs on quite a 
large scale. Their situation is advantageous because trade negotiators 
and the interest groups which push for protectionism have a tendency 
to think of primary products as the unambiguously desirable category 
of imports while imports of manufactures are thought of as needing to 90  Jean Waelbroeck 
be watched. Market penetration levels are quite low: developing coun- 
tries are far from having reached any upper bound to their exports to 
the three trading nations. However, export growth depends on their 
ability to diversify exports as their export volume rises, an ability they 
have so far demonstrated. 
The figures also reveal the impact of proximity on the intensity of 
trade, with each of the Big Three trading intensively with nearby de- 
veloping countries. There is also a curious “backyard effect,” where 
their trade with these countries yields an exceptionally large surplus. 
Study of the EC market suggests that member countries retain much 
tighter control over their domestic markets  than is usually thought. 
Perhaps the EC should be thought of not as a maker of policy in the 
usual sense but rather as an institutional device which softens economic 
aggression between its members and enables them to pool their bar- 
gaining power in dealing with the outside world. This suggests that 
influencing member country governments should be the main task of 
the trade diplomacy of developing countries rather than maintaining 
links with the EC in Brussels. Such an approach might in fact be more 
fruitful for all concerned since, by the time that the European Com- 
mission comes to the bargaining table, it has usually been assigned so 
tight a negotiating brief that it is hardly able to take account of unex- 
pected negotiating opportunities that might come up and to seek the 
deal that is truly most advantageous to all concerned. 
The composition of developing-country exports of manufactures to 
the EC confirms that the primary  components of their comparative 
advantage are the natural-resource and unskilled-labor content of the 
exported goods. Setting apart refined oil, the share of natural-resource- 
intensive goods in these countries’ exports of manufactures has been 
falling rapidly, a trend which reflects some missed opportunities that 
have been lost to natural-resource-rich  countries  such as Australia, 
Canada, and the United States. A very large share of other exports 
consists of unskilled-labor-intensive goods. 
The latter goods have been hit by protection, but the EC market 
continues to be very open. Trade restrictions for textiles and clothing 
are the strictest of all, but even there, loopholes and safety valves built 
into the protection system have so far permitted an import growth that 
is far from negligible. Apart from a few exceptions, any protection for 
other goods is casual. 
For  miscellaneous light  manufactures,  developing countries have 
shown much inventiveness in spotting opportunities to produce and to 
export goods which they are able to produce efficiently, given their 
factor costs and industrial experience; the list of such products is wid- 
ening as there become more of such “inventions”  and as the industrial 
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The last topic discussed in this paper, that of the opportunities that 
might arise in the troubled “new mature industries”  (steel, shipbuild- 
ing, and automobiles), is somewhat more speculative. The markets for 
their products are huge. Exports of their goods from developing coun- 
tries were very small in 1980. These industries are handicapped both 
in Europe and in the United States by adversary relations between 
employers and very powerful trade unions, which keep costs a good 
deal higher than they should be (an endogenous trade distortion valu- 
able to competitors). The more advanced NICs have shown themselves 
to be able to master the relevant technology. A breakthrough for these 
goods is unlikely to be as swift and decisive as that which developing 
countries achieved for textiles and clothing in the 1970s, because of 
both the competitiveness  of Japanese producers and the protection 
which these politically powerful industries are able to obtain. But the 
markets for those goods are so large that, even though market shares 
remain low, exports of these goods could make quite a large contri- 
bution to the foreign exchange receipts of the South. 
Notes 
1. The project was coordinated by H. Hughes and J. Waelbroeck.  A note 
by V.  Panoutsopoulos, presenting the concordances between national produc- 
tion statistics and the ISIC, will be available in the near future. The detailed 
SITCASIC concordance is available on request from the author. 
2. Thus figures have to be looked at carefully. “Other manufactures’ include 
diamonds, and because transit trade in  diamonds  is hard to separate from 
imports for further processing,  some market penetration rates exceed 100%. 
Refined petroleum  has a large weight in group 35,  and this accounts for the 
high penetration rate in that row of the table. 
3. For econometric studies of the determinants of protectionism, see Cable 
and Rebelo 1980; Glisman and Weiss 1980; Grilli and La Noce 1983; Koekkoek, 
Kol, and Mennes 1981, Lundberg 1981; Messerlin  1982; and Tharakan 1980. 
4. For econometric work of the World Bank group on comparative advantage 
of EC countries, see Cable and Rebelo 1980 and Tharakan 1980. In addition, 
F.  D.  Weiss has provided  a survey of  German  research on that  country’s 
comparative advantage (1983), while a detailed discussion of  Sweden’s com- 
parative advantage is given in Ohlsson  1982. 
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